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NOTES AND COMMENTS
porate reorganization proceedings. The sum above the amount of the
consideration paid for the bonds would then be held in trust for the
individual bondholder.
OscAR LEAK TYREE.
Criminal Law-Grand Juries-Independent Investigations.
Two recently considered legal problems have again brought to the
forefront the long unanswered question as to the power of the grand
jury to make, of its own motion, without a charge from the court or
the solicitor, investigations into violations of the criminal law.
The grand jury of the Guilford Superior Court, serving during the
first half of 1938, undertook, of its own motion, but with the knowl-
edge of the judge and solicitor of that district,1 to conduct an investiga-
tion of alleged fraudulent practices in the High Point Democratic
primary of June 4, 1938. The probe was carried out through the sub-
poenaing of witnesses to appear and answer the grand jury's interro-
gations.2' This investigation was not completed at the expiration of the
jury's service; therefore, it made a report to the court, not based specifi-
cally on warrants, and pointed out several particular instances where
the election laws had been violated.8 The newly assigned judge denied
the succeeding grand jury authority to proceed with the independent
investigation of the alleged offenses before it made a presentment of the
facts to the court.4 This new grand jury was thus restrained from
exercising the authority countenanced in its predecessor.
Recently the request of the grand jury of the Durham Superior
Court for funds with which to employ special .agents to assist it in
making an investigation was denied on the ground that it lacked the
authority to employ such special investigators, and that the county lacked
the authority to supply funds for such a purpose.5
These instances raise questions as to: (1) whether the grand jury
may, of its own motion, make an investigation of, and a present-
ment to the court concerning, violations of the criminal law with which
it is acquainted through its own knowledge or observation; (2) whether
it may so act upon information received from a third party; and if such
an investigation is allowed, (3) whether it may subpoena witnesses to
'Greensboro Daily News, July 14, 1938, p. 18, col. 6.
2 Greensboro Daily News, June 23, 1938, p. 1, col. 5; June 24, 1938, p. 22, col. 4.
3High Point Enterprise, July 12, 1938, p. 10, col. 1.
I Ibid.
Durham Morning Herald, Oct. 5, 1938, p. 4, col. 2. In a letter to Hon. Leo
Carr, dated Sept. 21, 1938, Assistant Attorney General Wettach expressed the
opinion, in behalf of Attorney General McMullan, that there does not appear to be
any express provision in the statutes which authorizes a county to employ special
investigators to assist the grand jury; and that an outside detective agency could
not be employed for this purpose without special legislative authority.
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appear before it and give testimony in a general inquiry; (4) whether
it may found a presentment upon evidence insufficient as the basis for a
bill of indictment; (5) whether it may employ outside agencies to assist
it in making investigations; and (6) whether, after the presentation of
a bill of indictment to it by the court, it may call for examination wit-
nesses other than those whose names appear on the bill or who are
sent to it by the court.
A presentment is the means by which the grand jury calls to the
attention of the court the existence of criminal practices with which
it is acquainted through its own knowledge or observation. Following
the grand jury's presentment the solicitor frames a bill of indictment,
indorses the names of the witnesses thereon, and then sends the bill
and the witnesses to the grand jury for their determination as to
whether or not it is a "true bill". Under the early common law the
grand jury was vested with powers to make presentments and to make
investigations and inquiries to uncover evidence to be used as a basis
for such presentments.7 The proposition that the grand jury may act
on its own knowledge or observation in making a presentment of alleged
criminal acts has been squarely upheld in North Carolina,8 in the federal
courts,9 and in a number of the state courts. 10  Thus, as a general
proposition, the great majority of courts vest the grand jury with such
powers," though some few states have held that it may act in no case
until the offense has been brought before a magistrate. 12
"'A presentment, properly speaking, is the notice taken by a grand jury of
any offence from their own knowledge or observation, without any bill of indict-
ment laid before them at the suit of the king. As the presentment of a nuisance,
a libel, and the like; upon which the officer of the court must afterwards frame
an indictment, before the party presented can be put to answer it." 4 Di.. ComM.
*301.
'1 CirTry, CRIMINAL LAW *162; 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (6th ed.
1868) §457, (h), cited in State v. Wilcox, 104 N. C. 847, 10 S. E. 453 (1889).8 State v. Cain, 8 N. C. 352 (1821); Lewis v. Commissioners, 74 N. C. 194
(1876) ; State v. Ivey, 100 N. C. 539, 5 S. E. 407 (1888) ; State v. Wilcox, 104
N. C. 847, 10 S. E. 453 (1889) ; see State v: Cox, 28 N. C. 440, 444 (1846);
State v. Morris, 104 N. C. 837, 839, 10 S. E. 454, 455 (1889).SIHousEL & WALSER, DEFENDINQ AND PROSECUTING FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
(1938) §224; 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (10th ed. 1918) §1264.
"Irwin v. Murphy, 129 Cal. App. 713, 19 P. (2d) 292 (1933); People v.
Graydon, 333 Ill. 429, 164 N. E. 832 (1929) ; Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 166
At,. 45 (1933) ; In re Jones, 101 App. Div. 55, 92 N. Y. Supp. 275 (2d Dep't
1905) ; In ra Osborne, 68 Misc. 597, 125 N. Y. Supp. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1910) ;. In re
Healy, 161 Misc. 582, 293 N. Y. Supp. 584 (Queens Co. Ct. 1937); Petition of
MaNair, 324 Pa. .48, 187 AtI. 498 (1936); State v. Bramlett, 166 S. C. 323,
164 S. E. 873 (1932); State v. Lee, 87 Tenn. 114, 9 S. W. 425 (1888); see
Ward v. State, 2 Mo. 120, 121, 22 Am. Dec. 449, 450 (1829) (in which the court
gives the grand jury very broad powers as a basis for its investigations, reports,
and indictments); 2 WHARTON, loc. cit. supra note 9.
1 2 WHARTON, loc. cit. supra note 9.
"Butler v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 159 (1885); CLARK, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE(2d ed. 1918) 128, §§47, 48; 2 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 9, §1265. In Pennsyl-
vania, however, a preliminary hearing before a magistrate is not necessary where
the offense is one of public notoriety, is within the. knowledge of the grand jury
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In State v. Wilcox's Justice Avery said: ".... it is their [the grand
jury's] duty to originate presentments as to all violations of law that
have come under the personal observation or knowledge of each juror,
and as to the commission of any offences of which they have informa-
tion, which they deem credible and which is so specific as to the nature
of the offence and witnesses as to enable the prosecuting officer to
frame an indictment upon it."
Justice Field, in his Charge To Grand Jury,14 specifically advised
that body of its power to investigate matters coming to its knowledge
from its own observations or in the course of its investigation into
matters placed before it; and later federal court decisions have con-
tinued to recognize these powers.15 The other state courts authorizing
such investigations and presentments follow practically the same view
as do the North Carolina or federal courts.'8 In twenty-eight of the
states the making of investigations and presentments has been imposed
on the grand jurors as a duty through specific statutory enactments.' 7
In considering whether the grand jury may utilize information gained
from third parties as the basis for such an investigation and pre-
sentment to the court, it would be well to make a distinction between:
(1) instances where the jurors receive information from third parties
who, in the interest of society and the general welfare, merely point out
the existence of criminal conditions without bringing any specific
charge in their own names and without acting in the role of private
prosecutors;18 and (2) instances where individuals, desirous of insti-
or its members, is given in charge by the court, or is sent up to them by the dis-
trict attorney. McCullough v. Commonwealth, 67 Pa. 30 (1870); Commonwealth
v. Green, 126 Pa. 531, 17 AtI. 878 (1889) ; 1 WHARTON, CRamINAL LAW (6th ed.
1868) §458 and note.
"104 N. C. 847, 850, 10 S. E. 453, 454 (1889).
1,30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,255 (C. C. D. Cal. 1872).
'See Hale v. (Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 63, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 374, 50 L. ed. 652,
660 (1906) ; United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 Fed. 765, 771 (W. D. N. C. 1883) ;
It re Hale, 139 Fed. 496, 498 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1905); Mclinney v. United
States, 199 Fed. 25, 32 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912) ; United States v. Philadelphia and R.
Ry., 225 Fed. 301, 306 (E. D. Pa. 1915).
' See note 10, supra.
2 These statutes have been assembled according to the express nature of their
provisions in AMERICAN LAW INsTrruTE, CoDE OF CUMiNA. PROCEDURE (Tent.
Draft No. 1, 1928) commentaries to §§137, 141.
"In King v. Second Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 173 So. 498 (Ala. 1937),
the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed a judgment of the lower court in favor
of a defendant in a suit for malicious prosecution. The defendant had reported
to the grand jury the commission of a criminal offense, furnished the names
of witnesses, and stated that he was informed that the guilty parties were the
plaintiffs here. This court said: "Public policy demands that the citizen, without
hazard to himself, may freely bring before the grand jury the fact that a crime
has been committed, request an investigation, and furnish such information as he
has in aid of the investigation. In this the citizen is not a prosecutor....
He is merely performing a duty in aid of the tribunal set up to ascertain whether
there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, and if so, who is
there probable cause to believe to be the guilty party."
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tuting proceedings for their own personal reasons, seek to appear before
the grand jury and make accusations and bring specific charges agaihst
alleged wrongdoers. In general the grand jury is allowed to utilize in-
formation received from this first class of informers, but the latter type
of persons are usually required to go before the solicitor instead of the
grand jury.
Certain dicta in the North Carolina cases would seem to indicate a
recognition of this distinction, support for which may also be drawn
from the common law materials.1 9 In Lewiis v. Commissioners20 the
court pointed out that the practice to be followed by private individuals
desiring to prosecute offenders is to inform the solicitor and have him
frame a bill of indictment against the accused, indorsing upon it the
name of the prosecutor, as such, and the names of his witnesses. The
bill, with the witnesses, is then sent before the grand jury. This
clearly indicates that those parties wishing to begin proceedings and
Aiake accusations should go before the solicitor and not before the
grand jury. Our court has, however, declared that presentments may
be founded not only upon facts of which the grand jury or some member
of that body had knowledge, but also ". . upon specific information
given in good faith and deemed to be credible .. .. "21 This would
seem to indicate that if they received information from a third party
in their ordinary course of conduct, they might act upon such in-
formation.
The federal courts have specifically denied private prosecutors the
right to go before the grand jury and present accusations.2 2 The basis
is that, as a general rule, such parties are actuated by private enmity
and seek merely the gratification of their personal malice; and the
grand jury cannot be made a means to the attainment of such ends.23
It has been said, however, that matters which "... otherwise come
to your knowledge touching the present service . . ." might be made
" In Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 59, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 373, 50 L. ed. 652, 659
(1906), Justice Brown indicated that "Under the ancient English system, criminal
prosecutions were instituted at the suit of private prosecutors, to which the King
lent his name in the interest of the public peace and good order of society. In
such cases the usual practice was to prepare the proposed indictment and lay it
before the grand jury for their consideration." He further pointed out that in such
cases of accusations by private persons a formal bill of indictment was laid before
the grand jury for their consideration, while they were privileged to hand up
presentments only of offenses of which they had taken notice from their own
knowledge or observation. Their powers to summon witnesses for the pur-
pose of a general inquiry would, however, support their use of information
gained from third parties who were not seeking to institute criminal proceedings
in their own names. "74 N. C. 194, 197 (1876).
"See State v. Morris, 104 N. C. 837, 839, 10 S. E. 454, 455 (1889).
2nited States v. Kilpatrick, 16 Fed. 765 (W. D. N. C. 1883); HOUSEL &
WALsER, op. cit. supra note 9, §225; 2 WHARTON, loc. cit. supra note 9.
Charge To Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,255 (C. C. D. Cal. 1872).
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the subject of inquiries ;24 and this has been defined to mean, in one
instance, knowledge gained from witnesses testifying concerning mat-
ters other than those under consideration.
2 5
Pennsylvania20 is in accord with the federal view and has stead-
fastly refused to allow individuals and their witnesses to go before the
grand jury and prefer charges. Illinois27 has held, as has Maryland,2 8
that the grand jury may inquire into all offenses against the common
law that come to its knowledge from any source; and these holdings
would indicate an inclination to allow the body to act on information
received from a third party.
Although the common law is not well defined as to the power of
grand juries to summon witnesses to appear before them and give testi-
mony in the absence of a direction or charge from the court or the solici-
tor, some authorities indicate that they did have general inquisitorial
powers.29 It has been stated that they had the authority originally to
summon witnesses to give tesimony in a general inquiry, and that they
could found presentments upon the evidence of such witnesses. 30 In
Wharton's Criminal Procedures' the theory is set forth that under
the old English practice the grand juries might institute all prosecu-
tions whatsoever, and this statement is supported by a reference to the
Report of the English Commissioners of 1879.
In Lewis v. Commissioners3 2 and State v. Wilcox"3 the North
Carolina court expressly denied the grand jury the right to send for
witnesses generally for the purpose of testifying as to mere matters of
inquiry which might lead to a presentment. This same view is adopted
Ibid. 1 2 WHrARToN, loc. cit. supra note 9.
"McCullough v. Commonwealth, 67 Pa. 30 (1870); Commonwealth v. Green,
126 Pa. 531, 17 At. 878- (1889); Petition of McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 187 Atl. 498
(1936).
2' Peoplev. Graydon, 333 111 429, 164 N. E. 832 (1929) ; People v. Sheridan,
349 Ill. 202, 181 N. E. 617 (1932).
,"Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 166 At, 45 (1933).
2 Justice Brown, in discussing the powers of the grand jury under the ancient
English system, said, in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 59, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 373,
5Q L. ed. 652, 659 (1906), "We are pointed to no case, however, holding that a
grand jury cannot proceed without the formality of a written charge. Indeed,
the oath administered to the foreman . . . indicates that the grand jury was
competent to act solely on its own volition."
"See note 7, supra.
112 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 9, §1260.
w74 N. C. 194 (1876). The plaintiff was summoned by the grand jury to tes-
tify in mere "matters of inquiry" to ". . . enable that body [the grand jury]
to ascertain whether the witness knew of any violation of the criminal law,
and, if he did, to make a presentment of it to the Court." The summons did
not command his attendance at a term of court, nor did it purport to be issued
by or under the authority of the court, nor to have been issued in behalf of the
state. In this suit for compensation for his time before the jury, the plaintiff
was denied relief on the ground that there was no provision of law for the pay of
witnesses where they are summoned merely to testify in matters of inquiry before
the grand jury, and that the grand jury had no authority to summon them for
such a purpose. - 104 N. C. 847, 10 S. E. 453 (1889).
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in Pennsylvania.8 4 The practice adhered to by the federal courts, how-
ever, allows the grand jury to examine witnesses before a presentment
has been made. It is sufficient to inform the witnesses of the names of
the parties with respect to whom they will be called to testify.85
Missouri80 has held that, without stating in the subpoena in what
particular matter or cause they were to testify, the grand jury might
subpoena witnesses to appear before it and testify generally. The only
restriction placed on the body in the conducting of a general inquiry is
that it cannot compel a witness to answer a question when his answer
might cause his own incrimination and conviction. Likewise the Mary-
land37 and Illinois 8s courts have supported the grand jury's unrestrained
powers by saying that they have plenary inquisitorial powers and may
call witnesses before them in the course of their investigations. Ten-
nessee's criminal code empowers the grand jury to send for and ex-
amine witnesses in regard to certain specified crimes,3 9 without having
received the permission of, or an order from, the court.40 In several
of the states, though no specific mention is made of any such restriction,
it would seem to follow, as a natural consequence of the general re-
straints that are placed upon the grand juries, that the independent sum-
moning of witnesses to appear before that body for the purpose of a
general inquiry is not a permissible practice.
4 1
Authorities on the common law powers of the grand jury make no
reference to this body's using its powers of presentment as a means to
make a mere report without intending that the framing of a bill of
indictment should follow. Though a bill of indictment could be made
without having been preceded by a presentment, the purpose of a pre-
sentment, when made, was to lay a basis upon which an indictment
might be framed by the officers of the court.42 In some instances the
I Petition of McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 187 Atl. 498 (1936) (though a presentment
may be made from the personal knowledge of the grand jurors, they may initiate
an investigation and inquiry only when charged by the court, and then only under
prescribed limitations).
'Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 50 L. ed. 652 (1906) ; Blair v.
United States, 250 U. S. 273, 39 Sup. Ct. 468, 63 L. ed. 979 (1919) ; United States
v. Philadelphia and R. Ry., 225 Fed. 301 (E. D. Pa. 1915); In re National
Window Glass Workers, 287 Fed. 219 (N. D. Ohio 1922); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283 (E. D. Pa. 1933).
" Ward v. State, 2 Mo. 120 (1829) ; State v. Terry, 30 Mo. 368 (1860) (jury
may ask witness whether he knows of any violation of the criminal law).
. I Blaney v. State, 74 Md. 153, 21 At. 547 (1891) ; Hitzelberger v. State, 196
AUt. 288 (Md. 1938).
People v. Graydon, People v. Sheridan, both supra note 27.
-"TENNw. CODE ANx. (Williams, 1934) §11592.
'State v. Barnes, 73 Tenn. 398 (1880).
'See State v. Taylor, 173 La. 1010, 1029, 139 So. 463, 470 (1931) ; Common-
wealth v. Green, 126 Pa. 531, 538, 17 AUt. 878, 880 (1889) ; Butler v. Common-
wealth, 81 Va. 159, 161 (1885).
'04 Br.. Comm. *301; 1 CHriTy, op. cit. supra note 7, at *163.
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statutes and decisions used the terms presentment and indictment synon-
ymously as an indication that their use was the same.43
In State v. Wilcox the North Carolina court defined the duty of
the grand jury as being to originate presentments upon ". .. informa-
tion, which they deem credible and which is so specific as to the nature
of the offence and witnesses as to enable the prosecuting officer to
frame an indictment upon it." This last phrase, stated by earlier North
Carolina decisions,44 seems to indicate that in this state the present-
ment is to be made only as the basis for the framing of a bill of indict-
ment.
In other states, however, the courts have indicated that grand juries
may sometimes make a presentment in the nature of a general report,
merely pointing out the existence of evil conditions without giving any
specific instructions sufficient to be made the basis of a bill of indict-
ment. But, where such reports are recognized, restraints have been
imposed so as to prevent any reflection on the conduct of specified
private individuals or placing them in a position of public scorn without
affording them opportunity to answer the accusations made against
them.45 Where the report concerns public officers' misconduct in office,
the courts vary as to whether the same restraints should be imposed.46
= HousL & WAxsER, op. cit. supra note 9, §222.
See State v. Cain, 8 N. C. 352, 353 (1821) ; State v. Cox, 28 N. C. 440, 444
(1846) ; State v. Ivey, 100 N. C. 539, 540. 5 S. E. 407 (1888).
0It re Healy, 161 Misc. 582, 293 N. Y. Supp. 584 (Queens Co. Ct. 1937) ; see
State v. Bramlett, 166 S. C. 323, 329, 164 S. E. 873, 875 (1932).
'In the case of In re Jones, 101 App. Div. 55, 92 N. Y. Supp. 275 (2d Dep't
1905), the majority opinion, in denying a motion to quash a presentment which
reported an investigation into the records and minutes of the clerk of the Board
of Supervisors of Nassau County, stated: "I think that if under the guise of a
presentment, the grand jury simply accuse, thereby compelling the accused to
stand mute, where the presentment would warrant indictment so that the accused
might answer, the presentment may be expunged; but I do not think that a pre-
sentment as a report upon the exercise of inquisitorial powers must be stricken
out if it incidentally point out that this or that public official is responsible for
omissions or commissions, negligence or defects." But the dissent expressed the
view that: "All of the old forms of criminal pleading being abolished, the people
being limited to an indictment, which shall charge the commission of a definite
crime,... and a presentment being the equivalent of an indictment in the common
law ... it follows that any' other action on the part of a grand jury in dealing
with a citizen is without authority of law ...." The New York Supreme Court
in a later case, In re Osborne, 68 Misc. 597, 125 N. Y. Supp. 313 (Sup. Ct.
1910), expressed the opinion that this dissenting opinion was founded on the
better reason; and that, although such a report may be made when confined to
matters or facts of general interest, the action of the grand jury should be checked
when it makes a report in which it accuses a citizen or officer of acts or conduct
which in themselves are not criminal. It was also held in In re Heffernan, 125
N. Y. Supp. 737 (Kings Co. Ct. 1909), that a mere report without indictment,
charging certain officials with neglect in the performance of their duties, should
be set aside and expunged from the records because the grand jury lacked the
authority to make such a report. But in the case of In re Healy, 161 Misc.
582, 293 N. Y. Supp. 584 (Queens Co. Ct. 1937), the court held that the statute,
N. Y. CRimix.AL CODE (Cahill, 1928) §260, requiring the grand jury to inquire
into misconduct in. office of public officers authorizes that body to hand up Lpre-
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In the federal courts the grand jury, upon its adjournment, often
makes a presentment upon some subject of public interest, pointing out
the existence of certain public needs, conditions which should be reme-
died and similar matters of general interest. Such presentments are
regarded as harmless and are accepted by the courts, though they are
rarely, if ever, acted upon. If, however, such a presentment is used
to assail the conduct of a public officer, a motion will lie to expunge it
from the records of the court .4
It would seem unlikely that the question whether the grand jury
could employ special investigators would arise under the old Eng-
lish system, for the jurors' fees were small and there were no provisions
for funds which might be used for this purpose. They were forced to
rely upon their own knowledge or that gained from their witnesses in
getting their evidence and information.48
In this country, however, instances have arisen where the grand jury
or its members have employed private detectives, accountants, and
counsel. In each case the state courts have ruled that, in the absence
of a specific statutory provision giving them that power, such acts
were unauthorized. 49 The general reasons set forth are that such a
procedure is against public policy5" because the grand jury would be
prejudiced in favor of the evidence procured for them by such agen-
cies; further, that since the ferreting out of evidence of crime is a
statutory duty expressly imposed upon certain officers of the govern-
ment, the existence of the power in other competent and efficient agen-
cies tends to negative an implied power in the grand jury. 51 Some
courts have ruled that where the grand jurors themselves bore the
expense, the practice was illegal.5 2
sentments after such inquiry, notwithstanding that the evidence discovered does
not warrant the finding of an indictment. In contrast to the opinion rendered in
In re Osborne the court here upholds the prevailing opinion in In re Jones,
on the ground that it expressed the intention of the legislature when it formulated
the above statute.
In Rector v. Smith, 11 Iowa 302 (1860), a report to the court by the
grand jury containing charges against a public officer was held not such a
privileged communication as would bar an action for libel; in Berinett v. Kalama-
zoo Circuit Judge, 183 Mich. 200, 150 N. W. 141 (1914), a grand jury's report
on the conduct of a public official was expunged on the ground that it lacked
authority to make presentments on matters other than trespasses to land and
violations of the election laws. '7 HousEL & WALSER, loc. cit. supra note 43.
"Dession and Cohen, The Inquisitorial Fwnctions of Grand Juries (1932)
41 YALE L. J. 687, 696.
"Woody v. Peairs, 35 Cal. App. 553, 170 Pac. 660 (1917) ; Stone v. Bell, 39
Nev. 240, 129 Pac. 458 (1912) ; Dession and Cohen, loc. cit. supra note 48.
Burns International Detective Agency v. Doyle, 46 Nev. 91, 208 Pac. 427
(1922), 26 A. L. R. 605 (1922), (1923) 7 MiNN. L. REv. 59.
'Allen v. Payne, 1 Cal. (2d) 607, 36 P. (2d) 614 (1934) ; note (1923) 26 A.
L. R. 605.
rePeople v. Kempley, 265 Pac. 310 (Cal. App. 1928), (1928) 12 MIm. L. REv.
761; Burns International Detective Agency v. Holt, 138 Minn. 165, 164 N. W.
590 (1917) ; note (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 613.
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The courts and legislatures in some jurisdictions have given con-
sideration to the problem whether, after considering a bill of indict-
ment placed before it or conducting an investigation on matters given
it by the court, the grand jury may, in an attempt to procure more
clarifying evidence, have more witnesses summoned to appear before
it or more evidence presented for its consideration. Chitty,53 in
remarking upon the common law practice, said: "The true intention
seems to be, that prima facie the grand jury have no concern with any
testimony but that which is regularly offered to them with the bill of
indictment. . . But if they are unable to satisfy themselves of the
truth sufficiently to warrant their determination, they may properly
seek other information relative to mere facts, but further than this
they cannot proceed."
In North Carolina the practice of summoning witnesses, as defined
by the courts and limited by the statutes, comes under the complete
control of the court and its officers. In Lewis v. Commissioners54 it
was decided that there is no authority for the examination of witnesses
by the grand jury, except where they are summoned, sworn, and sent to
that body by the court and accompanied by a bill of indictment upon
which their names are indorsed. It has been provided by statute55
that witnesses may be sworn by the foreman of the jury as well as by
the clerk of the court.50 This statute restricts the foreman, however, to
administering such oath or affirmation to those whose names are indorsed
on the bill of indictment by the officer prosecuting in behalf of the
state, or by the direction of the court. These authorities seem to indi-
cate that the North Carolina grand jury is entirely restricted to the
examination of those witnesses whose names appear on the bill pre-
sented by the court or prosecuting attorney. Under New York and
California statutes 57 grand juries seeking further information about an
incident may order the district attorney to issue subpoenas for such
other witnesses as they direct.58 In the federal courts the practice is
substantially the same. Justice Field charged" the grand jury: ". . . you
will receive all the evidence presented which may throw light upon the
matter under consideration, whether it tend to establish the innocence or
guilt of the accused. And more: if, in the course of your inquiries, you
have reason to believe that there is other evidence, not presented to you,
m 1 C~irv=, op. dt. supr note 7, at *318.
rA74 N. C. 194 (1876).
O'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §2336.
0 State v. Allen, 83 N. C. 680 (1880) ; State v. White, 88 N. C. 698 (1883).
7 N. Y. CRim. CoDE (Cahill, 1928) §609; CAL. PENAL CODE (Deering, 1937)
tit. 2, §1326.
See Pepple v. Davy, 105 Ap"p. Div. 598, 601, 94 N. Y. Supp. 1037, 1039(1st Dep't 1905).
1 Charge To Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,255 (C. C. D. Cal. 1872).
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within your reach, which would qualify or explain away the charge
under investigation, it will be your duty to order such evidence to be
produced." Other federal court decisions60 have upheld this charge.
But the person against whom the bill is brought may not be compelled
to appear and give testimony against himself,61 this protection being
reserved to him by the Fifth Amendment.
It is apparent from the preceding discussion that the grand jury
system, as adopted in the various states of this country, has, in many
instances, undergone changes which have lessened in some respects and
enlarged in others the powers vested in the grand jury under the com-
mon law. In some jurisdictions its full powers have been clearly set
out by statutes. In other jurisdictions judicial decisions have pro-
vided fairly clear definitions of this body's authority. There are but
few North Carolina authorities which may be relied upon to inform
the courts or the grand jurors themselves of the grand jury's power to
proceed on its own initiative. The existence of situations in which
there are variances of opinion, as to the grand jury's authority to make,
of its own motion, investigations and reports on matters coming to its
attention, is thus easily understood. In order that it successfully fulfill
its obligation to protect and uphold the morals and welfare of society,
the grand jury must be clearly and accurately informed of its powers
to perform these duties. We need clear and definitive legislative enact-
ments to supplenent the now scant and obscure authorities on this
point.
FRANK THOMAS MILLER, JR.
Ejectment-Common Source Rule-
Surface and Mineral Rights.
An action was brought to establish P's mineral rights in a tract of
land, the surface rights of which were admittedly in D. D denied P's
title and alleged title in himself by virtue of twenty years adverse
possession of the mineral rights or seven years adverse possession under
color of title. P offered evidence that in 1912 the land was claimed in
fee by the Toe River Land and Mining Co. P then showed that in that
year the land had been conveyed with reservation and exception of the
mineral rights, and that through mesne conveyances from the Toe River
Land and Mining Co. he had derived such title as that company had
reserved to these mineral rights. The surface rights had been conveyed
several times, each time with reservation and exception of the mineral
right, until in 1918 D's immediate grantor had conveyed the tract to
"o See United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 Fed. 765, 772 (W. D. N. C. 1883) ; United
States v. Terry, 39 Fed. 355, 362 (N. D. Cal. 1889); Carroll v. United States,
16 F. (2d) 951, 953 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
'HoussL & WALSER, op. cit. supra note 9, §230.
